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Partnering the public and private sector for the performance of depot-level maintenance
and repair is a relatively new concept. While partnering arrangements offer tremendous
opportunities to increase the efficiency of the industrial base; to be successful, these arrangements
require substantial effort and commitment from all involved parties. Partnering arrangements are
complicated by their reliance upon full and open communication, plus their dependency on the
total commitment of senior leadership from all involved organizations. Phase I of the Abrams
Integrated Management for the Twenty-First Century (AIM XXI) program, a partnering
arrangement between General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and Anniston Army Depot
(ANAD), which called for the complete rebuild and modernization of 17 MlAls, offers valuable
insight to acquisition professionals who are considering establishing a partnering arrangement. A
principal finding of this research is the necessity for partnering arrangements to have the long-
term commitment of senior management, and be thoroughly disseminated throughout the involved
organizations, particularly to the mid-level managers who are responsible for executing the
arrangement. Open and honest communication is the key to the success of partnering
arrangements. Partnering is more than a new buzz-word brought about by Acquisition Reform
(AR). It is a new dimension to the relationship between the public and private sectors.
Acquisition officials must ensure that the parties fully understand this, and the groundwork for
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The purpose of this research paper is to examine partnering arrangements between
the public and private sector for the performance of depot-level maintenance and repair.
The researcher has developed a case analysis of the non-contractual partnering
arrangement between General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) and Anniston Army
Depot (ANAD) in executing phase I of the Abrams Integrated Management for the
Twenty-First Century (ATM XXI) project.
B. BACKGROUND
The Federal Government has always relied on the private sector to supply some
amount of goods and services. One of the first examples of this occurred during the
Revolutionary War when the Navy needed help building the USS CONSTITUTION. The
project had fallen behind schedule, so "the Government summoned shipbuilders to Boston
from as far as Georgia." [9, plO] Since that time there has been, in some form or another,
an industrial base tailored to providing goods and services to the Federal Government.
A recent push among many lawmakers is to outsource or privatize many public
jobs. Others however believe privatization would place the Department of Defense (DoD)
in a position of trying to "negotiate readiness." The latter feel that the possible savings
gained by privatization and outsourcing are not worth the risk incurred. In other words, if
we are called to war will we be ready? Finally, there is the group that wants further
analysis subsequent to committing themselves to one school of thought. This last group
realizes that there are benefits to outsourcing and privatization, but wishes to explore
additional alternatives to see which one best satisfies DoD's needs. Those factions
looking for opportunities to outsource are aggressively pursuing recent efforts to
outsource many infrastructure assets.
DoD has identified their maintenance depots as one possible activity to outsource.
It does seem to make sense It would appear that the maintenance activities' functions
would cross over nicely to private organizations since, at the time of the 1995 Base
Realignment and Closure (BRAC), the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that
the DoD depot system had 40 percent excess capacity.
The DoD is not alone in stating that the maintenance depots are a strong candidate
for outsourcing. In a 1996 study, the Defense Science Board (DSB) strongly supported
outsourcing. The report stated, "DoD could use outsourcing as an important tool to free
up substantial funds to support defense modernization. — While the Services and Defense
Agencies are making progress in developing outsourcing programs, a broader, more
aggressive outsourcing effort is needed." [12]
As an alternative to outsourcing, DoD has begun an initiative to foster partnering
arrangements between public and private industry. Partnering arrangements capitalize on
the strengths of the total industrial base and creates a greater capability to surge in time of
crisis Partnering arrangements are a new concept and represent a departure from
previous practices in which the public and private sectors were not encouraged to work
together.
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Primary Research Question
Based on the lessons learned from the ATM XXI partnering arrangement between
GDLS and ANAD, what are the critical ingredients for successfully forming a
public/private partnership?
2. Secondary Research Questions
a. What is the overall DoD environment in relation to the performance of depot-
level maintenance and repair and how does this influence the ATM XXI program?
b. How does the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) impact the partnering
arrangement?
d. How does the "Arm's-Length" interface between the public/private sector
impact partnering arrangements?
e. What are the key considerations for a contracting professional in structuring a
partnering arrangement?
D. SCOPE OF THE THESIS
The researcher has analyzed the partnering arrangement from a contracting
officer's perspective using phase I of the AIM XXI project a case study. It includes a
literature review of major outsourcing/partnering issues that affect depot-level
maintenance, as well as provided an overview of the current depot-level maintenance and
repair. The partnering arrangement between GDLS and ANAD has been examined, with
concentration on business management, work relations, and disputes resolution.
E. METHODOLOGY
The first objective of this research paper is to provide an overview of the current
public/private relationship within DoD regarding the performance of depot-level
maintenance and repair. This will be accomplished through a literature review of sources
including, but not limited to, the following:
• Unclassified Department of Defense publications;
• Published academic research papers;
• References, publications and electronic media (e.g., National Technical
Information Service) available at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS) library;
• Internet websites and homepages (DoD, commercial, and academic); and
• Interviews with faculty at NPS
The next objective is to perform a case analysis of the partnering arrangement
between GDLS and ANAD for phase I of the AIM XXI project. The primary sources of
information has been the Government program management office (Program Manager
M1A1), the contractor (General Dynamics Land Systems), the defense depot (Anniston
Army Depot), and Tank-Automotive Command (TACOM) project integrators. Also,
interviews have been conducted with the Procuring Contract Officer (PCO) and
Administrative Contracting Officer (ACO). Lessons learned have been extracted from
phase I of the AIM XXI case analysis.
F. ORGANIZATION
• Chapter I. Introduction The introduction identifies the focus and purpose of
the thesis and states the primary and subsidiary research questions.
• Chapter II. Defense Depot Environment This section provides an overview of
the current environment and policies governing depot-level maintenance in
DoD Chapter II also provides background information on the history of
ANAD and their relationship with GDLS
• Chapter III. The Ml Abrams, Partnering, and the AIM XXI Project
Introduces the Ml Al Abrams Main Battle Tank and provides a short history
of the vehicle. Next it provides an thorough inquiry of partnering
arrangements Lastly, it provides background on the overall AIM XXI project
and the partnering arrangement between GDLS and ANAD.
• Chapter IV. AIM XXI Case Analysis Provides analysis of the major
partnering issues and challenges in the AIM XXI project, and
• Chapter V. Summary, Recommendations, and Conclusions Summarizes the
findings of the research, and answers the research questions.
G. BENEFITS OF STUDY
The primary benefit of this study is documentation of major contract management
lessons learned from the partnering arrangement for phase I of the AIM XXI project.
Future PCOs and ACOs can benefit from the experiences of current programs and use
these lessons to continuously improve the partnering process.

II. DEFENSE DEPOT ENVIRONMENT
A. CHAPTER INTRODUCTION
America's role as a superpower is based on many interrelated factors. One of
these factors is its strong military, supported by a robust infrastructure. This infrastructure
is composed of both public and the private-sector elements. Within the public-sector is the
defense depot, which provides depot-level maintenance and repair of military weapon
systems, parts, assemblies, and subassemblies.
For many years the subject of who should provide the lion's share of support to
DoD weapon systems has caused much controversy and has been thoroughly studied and
debated on Capitol Hill. In spite of the studies and debates, the workload balance between
the public and private-sector has yet to be resolved in a mutually satisfactory manner.
This purpose of this chapter is to provide an overview of the defense depot system
from a historical perspective. The chapter includes background on DoD policies,
regulations, and guidance concerning depot-level maintenance and repair Next is a
discussion of the controversy regarding the performance of depot-level maintenance and
repair. This section provides the reader with a better understanding of the politically-
charged environment surrounding the issue of depot maintenance workload distribution
The final section discusses the historical relationship between GDLS and ANAD.
B. DEFENSE DEPOT BACKGROUND
Depot-Level maintenance and repair entails repair, rebuild, major overhaul, limited
manufacture of parts, technical support, modifications, testing, reclamation, and software
maintenance. [39, pi] The private-sector has traditionally provided the weapon systems
themselves to include much of the research and development, and manufacturing
capabilities. Subsequent to the end of the cold war, the depot system enjoyed a reasonably
stable existence. At their high point in 1987, the depot system had 156,000 Federal
Government employees and operated some 38 depots and shipyards.
The depot system was designed around the premise that the necessary skills,
facilities, and equipment to sustain a protracted engagement of sizable force against
substantial enemy were not immediately available in the private-sector. [39, p2] When the
cold war ended, leaving only one super-power, the United States was forced to reexamine
its role in world politics and the manner in which it provided for the national defense. In
examining its National Military Strategy and military structure, it realized the cold war
military was no longer justifiable given current and projected threats. Furthermore, there
was a growing concern among many Americans regarding the country's national debt,
which exceeded three trillion dollars. A balanced budget had not passed through both the
legislative and executive branches of the Federal Government in two decades. This
growing concern among the voters elevated the issue of national debt into the political
arena The Federal Government began a search for the 'peace-dividends" created by the
conclusion of the Cold War
To achieve these peace dividends, in 1988 the United States began a drawdown of
its military forces. Simultaneously, the military was undergoing a Base Realignment and
Closure (BRAC) process These efforts were designed to 'right size" the military
structure to more efficiently meet the requirements of national defense. Currently, after
three rounds of BRAC, the depot system has 89,000 Federal Government employees and
operates 30 major depot maintenance facilities. Of the 30 depot maintenance facilities still
in operation, some are in the process of closing. [39, p2] 'When the BRAC process is
completed in 2001, only 19 of the 38 major organic depots that existed in 1988 will
remain in operation as Government activities." [39, p2]
C. DOD DEPOT MAINTENANCE AND REPAm POLICY
DoD plainly states that depot maintenance capabilities are and will continue to be
vital to national security However, they do not mandate who must provide this
capability. DoD cites, as their major attribute, the depot's focus on responsive capabilities
to ensure readiness and sustainability for the Total Force in both peace and war. In the
overview of depot maintenance DoD does stress they are, 'attempting to create the
leanest possible infrastructure consistent with providing essential support capabilities."
[39, p6]
DoD delegates, to each of the Service components, responsibility for providing an
adequate program for maintenance of assigned material in accordance with specific
policies. An overview of the policies effecting depot-level maintenance follows: [39, p8-
58]
1) Establish core depot maintenance capabilities to meet essential wartime
demands, promote competition, and sustain institutional expertise. These capability
requirements shape the minimum amount of organic depot facilities, equipment, and
personnel that DoD maintains as a ready and controlled source of technical competence.
Core capabilities mitigate the operational risks associated with maintaining readiness for
successfully completing, and expeditiously recovering from contingency operations. DoD
defines core as, [39, p8]
the capability maintained within organic Defense depots to meet
readiness and sustainability requirements of the weapon systems that
support the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) contingency scenario(s). Core
exists to minimize operational risks and to guarantee required readiness for
these weapon systems Core depot maintenance capabilities will comprise
only the minimum facilities, equipment, and skilled personnel necessary to
ensure a ready and controlled source of required technical competence.
Depot maintenance for the designated weapon systems will be the primary
workloads assigned to DoD depots to support core depot maintenance
capabilities.
DoD also emphasizes in their policy letter, [39, p9]
It is important to note that not all critical or mission-essential
weapon systems and equipment will necessarily be maintained in organic
depot maintenance facilities, but the capability to perform depot
maintenance on designated weapon systems must be maintained
organically. Simply put, core represents the minimum amount of
maintenance capability that the DoD Components must maintain in organic
depot facilities to ensure that contingency operations are not compromised
because of a lack of essential depot maintenance support.
In order to facilitate the Service component's determination of core capability
requirements and the depot maintenance workloads necessary to sustain these capabilities,
DoD developed a standard methodology. After each Service component has determined
their core requirements, DoD then sums this information to become the total DoD
requirement for core. The primary modification in the modified methodology is a best
value assessment of the private-sector's ability to assume workloads not required to
maintain the capability of the organic industrial base. The Services will conduct a risk
assessment for essential workloads that historically dictate retention as a core capability.
The process provides for the private-sector competing for those workloads they are able
to perform with acceptable risk, reliability and efficiency. Workloads not required to
sustain core do not require a risk assessment. In addition, the Services recognize that a
system may be divided into its components and that not all the depot maintenance of a
weapon system is necessary to sustain core capability. Therefore, there may be a mix of
private and public-sector support for the same system
2) Structure depot maintenance support capabilities to provide essential levels of
readiness and sustainability.
3) Support depot maintenance workloads using a mix of both public-sector and
private-sector capabilities.
4) Make 'best value" a primary consideration in satisfying workload requirements
other than those necessary to sustain core capabilities.
5) Use evaluation procedures for depot maintenance workload competitions that
provide, in the case of public/sector - private-sector competitions, comparable as well as
comprehensive costs for the public-sector.
6) Establish and monitor performance metrics for both organic and contract depot
maintenance operations
7) Establish financial management processes that provide accurate and
comprehensive reporting of depot maintenance efforts at both the macro and workload
levels.
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8) Ensure that organic depots can compete with private-sector sources of repair
when there does not appear to be adequate competition for specific DoD workloads
within the private sector; restrict from any such competitions those organic depots that are
being closed.
9) Permit organic depots to sell services and goods, when appropriate, to other
Federal Agencies and the private-sector in support ofDoD requirements.
10) Accomplish weapon system modifications and upgrades in the private-sector
except when it is more efficient and economical to accomplish such work concurrent with
other organic depot maintenance.
1 1) Ensure that in placing workloads in the private-sector, DoD receives gains that
are typically made possible by the operation of market forces (e.g., reduced costs and
cycle times)
12) Plan on supporting new or developing weapon systems in the private-sector
consistent with the DoD core policy.
13) Encourage best value commercial firms to enter into stable partnerships with
organic facilities and to co-use organic capabilities consistent with applicable statutes.
14) Permit leasing out of under-utilized DoD plants and equipment to contractors
consistent with applicable statutes.
15) Ensure that Government facilities that transition into private sector entities can
be reestablished in the case of national emergency or nonperformance.
D. DEFENSE DEPOT CURRENT POLITICS: BEYOND THE BRAC
In addition to downsizing actual military forces by 700,000 people since 1989 —
about one-third of the active force, defense spending has been cut by 45 percent since
1985 'In Fiscal Year (FY) 1998, defense spending will represent only three percent of
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) ~ the lowest since before World War II." [48, p24]
Hardest hit by the cuts in defense spending have been the modernization or
investment accounts. In fact, in constant FY96 dollars, procurement, also known as
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modernization, has fallen from a peak of $126 billion in FY85 to only $39 billion in FY96
— a 69 percent reduction. Today, modernization accounts constitute only 18 percent of
the total DoD budget. DoD is committed to maintaining readiness, quality of life, and
modernization; while, simultaneously, the amount of dollars available to meet these
demands are either steadily decreasing or promised in the out years. This is not an easy
task DoD feels it can meet these challenges today and free-up the additional resources
required for modernization in the future by managing its internal operations, and
particularly its support activities, more efficiently. [38, p2-5]
The Military is dedicated to achieving the DoD goal of maximizing the utility of
every dollar spent. Gen Dennis J Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, personally showed his
support for the initiative by stating,
I think you do it [improving the modernization account] by
focusing on acquisition reform. To the extent that you become more
efficient for privatization and outsourcing, you look at those things. The
whole idea here is to try to get more buying power out of the dollars that
were given. [33, pi 2]
DoD has begun a series of initiatives to increase the efficiency of its operations.
First, the DoD has significantly reduced infrastructure costs through BRAC process. In
FY96, the BRAC budget crossed over from a net loss to a net surplus on DoD budgets.
BRAC will generate net savings of $17.8 billion dollars over the next five years. DoD
estimates that the four BRACs, when fully implemented, will result in an annual net saving
of approximately $5.5 billion Second, DoD has initiated a thorough reform of the
acquisition process They are currently implementing these reforms. DoD is beginning to
see results and believe the reforms will lead to substantial efficiencies and savings in the
future. Third, DoD is now beginning a systematic review of its support operations to
determine where competitive forces can improve overall performance at lower cost.
Outsourcing, privatization, and business reengineering offer significant opportunities to
generate many of the savings necessary for modernization and readiness.
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E. DEPOTS' UTILITY IN QUESTION
Since World War II, the private-sectors' capabilities have significantly increased,
permitting DoD to rely more heavily on them for efficient and effective depot-level
maintenance In fact, the DoD has relied on the private-sector for the production of most
new weapon systems due to the private-sector's increased capabilities. This increased
capability in the private-sector along with the perception of less bureaucracy and greater
flexibility has caused many to ask if there is actually a requirement to maintain a seemingly
redundant infrastructure in both the public and private-sectors. This situation was further
exacerbated by three reports indicating that much of the infrastructure work performed by
DoD was redundant, inefficient, and could be performed by the private-sector for less
cost. A summary of these reports follows: [42, p2]
1. Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM)
The CORM was published in 1995. It was the first significant study to indicate
that there are significant cost saving available to DoD through outsourcing traditionally
public functions. In the CORM's charter, they were tasked to identify opportunities to
increase efficiency and save money. In doing this the CORM reviewed all central support
activities: logistics, medical, training, personnel, headquarters, acquisition management,
and installations and facilities. The CORM first highlighted that over a quarter of a million
DoD employees engage in commercial-type activities that could be performed by private
industry. The study suggested that there are achievable cost reductions of approximately
20 percent. In addition to cost reductions, the CORM wrote that private industry could
simultaneously enhance effectiveness.
While addressing the area of material management, the CORM recommended that
the Government essentially outsource all wholesale-level warehousing and distribution,
wholesale-level weapon system depot maintenance and repair, property control and
disposal, and incurred-cost auditing ofDoD contracts. [37, pESl]
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The CORM made several suggestions regarding opportunities to pursue in
achieving the cost savings and enhanced efficiency. Their primary insistence was to
implement the long standing national policy of relying primarily on the private-sector for
services that need not be performed by the government, and to reengineer the remaining
government support organizations. The following are the CORM's recommendations
regarding outsourcing and depot-level maintenance and repair: [37, p3-3 - 3-8]
• Outsource all commercial type support activities.
• Outsource new support requirements.
• OMB withdraw Circular A-76; Congress repeal or amend legislative
restrictions, DoD extend to all commercial-type activities a policy of avoiding
public/private competition where adequate private-sector competition exists.
• DoD move to a depot maintenance system relying on the private-sector.
• Direct support of all new systems to competitive private contractors.
• Establish a time-phased plan to privatize essentially all existing depot-level
maintenance.
• Create an office under the ASD (Economic Security) to oversee privatization
of depots.
While the CORM ardently argues to outsource essentially all material management
functions, they acknowledge the value of highly-skilled work forces, and heavily-
capitalized depot facilities. They suggested that these assets would make the depots prime
candidates for privatization-in-place
The CORM does concede that although there are tremendous savings available
through outsourcing many commercial activities, not all commercial activities lend
themselves to outsourcing. The conditions for favorable outsourcing may not always be
present and the Government must retain certain core functions to best serve the public
interest. [37, p3-3] However, the CORM concludes their recommendations by stating that
DoD should rely on the private-sector for all new support activities.
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2. Defense Science Board (DSB) on Outsourcing and Privatization
a. General Recommendations ofthe DSB
The DSB report was released in 1996. The charter of the DSB task force
on outsourcing and privatization was to develop recommendations on ways DoD could
use outsourcing as an important tool to free-up substantial funds to support defense
modernization needs. The DSB task force was convinced that an aggressive DoD
outsourcing initiative will improve the quality of support services at significantly reduced
costs. The task force recommended that the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) set a target
of the year 2002 to generate between seven to twelve billion dollars in outsourcing-related
savings to fund the expansion of investment programs for DoD. The task force asserted a
belief that all DoD support functions should be contracted out to prime vendors except
those inherently governmental functions, which are directly involved in warfighting, or
where no adequate private-sector capability exists or can be expected to be established. In
order to achieve these benefits the DSB task force recognizes that three major changes
must take place: [40, p2]
1
.
changes in Defense policies and procedures to facilities outsourcing
2. relief from legislative impediments and regulatory constraints
3. improvements in Defense contracting procedures and incentives to
encourage greater reliance on outsourcing.
The task force indicated that most defense agencies are prime candidates
for outsourcing. The task force specifically recommended DoD consider outsourcing
major portions of the Defense Commissary Agency (DCA), the Defense Information
Systems Agency (DISA), and the Defense Finance and Accounting Service (DFAS) to
initiate steps toward streamlining defense infrastructure.
Much of the DSB's information was developed by extrapolating
outsourcing data from the private and public-sector. They cited studies that indicate that
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outsourcing is expanding rapidly to provide a wide range of services. The report also
indicated that although cost savings are a factor in outsourcing; other benefits are reaped
through outsourcing, to include access to better technology and better qualified people.
Many companies turn to outsourcing to allow management to focus more of their time and
energy on the business' s core competencies. The public-sector has also confirmed the
value of outsourcing. Many Federal, State, and Local Government functions have been
outsourced and resulted in over a thirty percent savings and providing better, more
responsive support.
b. Private-sector Outsourcing: Lessons Learned
The task force captured many lessons learned from the private-sectors'
experiences while transitioning to outsourcing services. These critical ingredients for a
successful outsourcing venture are focused on management issues. [40, p 22A]
• Senior executive leadership: The commitment to make this work must be top-
driven.
• Outsource broad processes. This permits the streamlining of contract
management and oversight functions. It also encourages greater synergy of
outsourced activities.
• View benefits from life-cycle: The true benefits of outsourcing may take time
to fully manifest themselves. Disagreements regarding scope or vendor
strategies are common during the early stages of outsourcing.
• Small, highly-trained oversight cadre: The savings and flexibility provided by
outsourcing could be lost if the client firm imposes a large and bureaucratic
oversight structure.
• Partnership: Foster an environment of collaborative problem-solving rather
than an adversarial or us-versus-them relationship. "Outsourcer must establish
a true partnership with the vendor and approach problem-solving as a team."
16
c. Legislative Prohibitions to Outsourcing
The CORM identified several legislative provisions that restrict DoD's
ability to increase its reliance on the private-sector. These provisions and a brief summary
of each are listed below: [40, p38A]
1) 10 USC 2461 : Mandates extensive reporting to Congress, including cost
comparison study, subsequent to outsourcing any function performed by more than 45
DoD employees.
2) 10 USC 2464: Requires SECDEF to identify "core" logistics functions
which cannot be outsourced, and prohibits DoD from changing the classifications to non-
core without the approval of Congress.
3) 10 USC 2465: Prohibits outsourcing of civilian firefighters and security
guard functions at military bases.
4) 10 USC 2466: Limits outsourcing of depot maintenance to 40 percent of
the funds available.
5) 10 USC 2469: Depot maintenance greater than three million dollars may
not be outsourced without conducting a public/private competition.
6) Section 8020 of the FY96 DoD Appropriations Act: Prohibits DoD
from expending any funds to outsource DoD functions performed by more than ten DoD
civilian employees until a most efficient and cost effective analysis has been completed and
the results certified to the Congressional Committees on Appropriations.
7) Section 8043 of the FY96 Appropriations Act: Prohibits DoD from
expending any funds on A-76 cost comparison studies that exceed 24 months for one
function or for 48 months for more than one function.
8) Section 317 of the FY87 DoD Authorization Act: Prohibits DoD from
outsourcing any function performed at McAlester or Crane Army Ammunition Plants.
The task force described the impact of the above mentioned impediments by
stating they: [40, p39A]
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increase the involvement of Congress in outsourcing decisions and
expand opportunities for Congressional micromanagement; require
extensive Congressional notifications and reporting, including the
preparation of exhaustive cost analysis studies; impose arbitrary limits on
the share depot-level maintenance workload that may be outsourced to
private contractors, and establish arbitrary exemptions from outsourcing of
selected functions such as fire safety and physical security. Moreover, the
history of Congressional reaction to past DoD outsourcing initiatives has a
"chilling effect" on DoD activities that are considering contracting out
other workloads.
Taken together, the current legal environment encourages the
politicization of the outsourcing decision process, and thereby complicates,
delays, and discourages DoD efforts to increase its reliance on private
vendors for support services.
d DSB Examination ofA-7
6
The task force criticized the contradictory and restrictive nature of Office
of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-76 Performance of Commercial Activities.
This publication is commonly known as A-76 [41, piii] A-76 was written to establish
Federal policy for the performance of recurring commercial activities. It has been revised
periodically over the years. The latest revision of A-76 was written in March 1996. The
task force claims that A-76 is contradictory and restrictive because it states that the official
policy of the Federal Government is to rely primarily on the private-sector for commercial-
type products and services. However, A-76 establishes 'highly formalized, legalistic, and
time-consuming procedures for conducting public/private competitions. These procedures
favor government entities and ultimately discourage an aggressive DoD strategy to
outsource support functions. '{40, p41A] The task force argued that A-76 favors the
government in Public/Private Competition (PPC) due to the process it established to
conduct a PPC First, a Performance Work Statement (PWS), defining the function's
subject to PPC, must be developed After finalizing the PWS, DoD solicits bids or
proposals from the private-sector. Concurrently, the public-sector organization
performing the function considered for PPC submits a bid or proposal based on its Most
Effective Organization (MEO), not on its current prevailing cost structure. 'The MEO
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may project staff reductions or other cost-saving measures to reduce the costs of
performing the completed function." DoD then compares the bids/proposals. Again the
advantage goes to the public-sector; unless the private-sector bid/proposal is more than 10
percent below the public-sector's or projected savings exceed $10 million over five years,
the work remains with the public-sector If the work does remain with the public-sector,
the MEO is implemented through the budget process and personnel end strength
authorizations. Another fault in the PPC is the time required to complete the process
'The Services indicate that the A-76 process takes at least 24 months for simple, narrow
functions requiring only the submissions of sealed bids. More complex or multiple
functions involving full technical and cost proposals require 48 months or more." This
greatly inhibits DoD's ability to conduct PPCs and comply with Section 8043 of the FY96
Appropriations Act. In addition to these restrictions, Congress removed depot-level
maintenance from the jurisdiction of A-76 in the mid- 1 980' s. The task force further
claimed that the PPC favors the public-sector due to the public-sector's lack of accounting
systems and internal controls needed to ensure an accurate allocation of indirect costs.
They state that the cost accounting systems are designed for control, reporting to
Congress, not managing enterprises.
e. DSB's Conclusion and Final Recommendation
The task force viewed outsourcing as a practical means to freeing up the
critical resources necessary to modernize our forces, not as an end to itself. In conclusion,
the DSB task force stated that, 'as a matter of principle as well as for reasons of sound
policy, all DoD support activities that are commercial in nature should be provided by
private venders ." [40, p3-8] In addition, they stated that the Government should not be
competing for business with its own citizens and that private-sector is the primary source
of creativity, innovation, and efficiency; and are more likely to provide cost-effective
support to the Military Forces. The following list is the key elements of an aggressive
outsourcing strategy, as proposed by the Task Force: [40, p50A]
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• Establish a presumption of outsourcing.
• Reduce reliance for A-76.
• When A-76 is necessary, expedite the process and "level the playing field."
• Outsource broad support functions.
• Eliminate statutory and institutional impediments.
• Establish implementation plan with aggressive targets and milestones - hold
senior managers accountable.
3. Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR)
The QDR was established to "develop an overarching defense strategy to deal with
the world today and tomorrow, identify required military capabilities, and define the
programs and policies needed to support them." The QDR quickly points out the 38
percent reduction in the defense budget, since 1985. Of the 38 percent budget cut, force
structure absorbed 33 percent, and procurement programs, 65 percent. While the QDR
praises its success in carefully protecting military readiness to carry out its missions during
the drawdown, it also acknowledges its failure to acquire the modern technology and
systems essential for protecting our national security interest in the future. [25, pi]
To repair this deficiency, the QDR examined three alternatives. The alternatives
differed in where they accepted risks and emphasized procurement spending over the near
term, midterm, and long term. The QDR chose to pursue the alternative that best delivers
a balance between the present and future. This alternative recognizes that U.S. interest
and responsibilities do not allow us to choose between the present and the future. This
balanced approach retains enough force structure to sustain leadership and meet today's
requirements, while consecutively investing in the future force.
This balanced alternative requires reallocation of resources and priorities to
achieve the optimum capabilities to shape, respond, and prepare over the full period
covered by the QDR. Part of the reallocation will include trimming current forces;
primarily in the support structure. 'To preserve combat capability and readiness, the
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Services have targeted the reductions by streamlining infrastructure and outsourcing non-
military-essential functions." [25, p6] Secretary Cohen highlights force structure been
reduced by 33 percent and will have declined by 36 percent when the QDR initiatives are
complete. However, the domestic infrastructure will have only been reduced by 21
percent. He makes the this analogy, 'In essence, our combat forces are headed towards
the 21
st
century, but our infrastructure is stuck in the past. We cannot afford this waste of
resources in an environment of tough choices and fiscal constraint." [25, p9]
The QDR praises the ongoing efforts to streamline DoD business practices and
acknowledges the savings reaped through the initiatives of acquisition reform and the first
four BRAC rounds. The report then states that DoD needs to go much further and
deeper in cutting cost, and they need congressional support. Their review identified
enough excess infrastructure to justify two additional rounds of BRAC; including
research, development and test facilities, laboratories, and ranges.
The QDR maintains that DoD must make many tough evaluations regarding their
institutions and infrastructure's contribution to overall military effectiveness. Secretary
Cohen proclaims, "Ultimately, we need to decide what is more important: [25, plO]
• keeping a maintenance depot in government hands, or putting advanced
technology in soldiers' hands;
• protecting a facility, or protecting our forces;
• preserving local defense contracts, or promoting solid enlistment contracts."
Section VIII of the report is devoted to DoD's plan to achieve a 21st Century
Defense Infrastructure. The report stresses DoD's need to be leaner, more efficient, and
more cost-effective to best serve the warfighter faster, better, and cheaper in the 21st
Century. The forces envisioned for the 21st Century require a radically different support
structure and steadily increasing modernization accounts. DoD has identified support
operations as the best source of funds for modernization.
DoD describes its infrastructure as, "a diverse set of activities carried out by an
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even more diverse set of organizations." [26, p6] The support operations include:
installations, training programs for military personnel; logistics support; central personnel
services; headquarters functions; medical care for active duty, their family and retired
military personnel; science and technology programs; central command; and
communications services. In total, this infrastructure comprises 61 percent of DoD
employees.
To address Secretary Cohen's concerns regarding the disparity between the
reductions of force structure and infrastructure, the report proposed the following actions:
[26, P2]
• Make a further reduction of 109,000 civilian and military personnel associated
with infrastructure beyond the initiatives in the DoD budget for FY98. This
will bring the reductions in infrastructure to 39 percent, since 1989.
• Request authority for two additional rounds ofBRAC, one in 1999 and the
second in 2001.
• Improve the efficiency and performance ofDoD support activities by adopting
innovative management and business practices of the private-sector.
The Bottoms Up Review (BUR) and other previous studies that had identified
similarities between large portions of DoD infrastructure and business activities, and the
recognition that American business practices have undergone a revolutionary
transformation, motivated the QDR to examine the operations of DoD infrastructure.
Prior to the QDR, DoD had planned to reduce infrastructure-related personnel by 58,000
civilian and 20,000 military positions over the Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP). After
examining lessons learned from the private-sector's reengineering, DoD believes they can
further reduce infrastructure costs and personnel requirements. To achieve this reduction
the QDR proposed: [26, p4]
Conduct public-private competitions for depot maintenance
work that does not contribute to core capability when other
appropriate outsourcing criteria are met. In addition, we will
partner in-house facilities with industry to preserve depot-level skills
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and utilize excess capacity. Savings will be achieved as a result of
these competitions and the reductions in excess capacity.
In conclusion, the QDR acknowledged that some of their proposals were not
within their authority to determine The report identified legislation that DoD must seek
to have revoked to facilitate their efforts to lower infrastructure cost without sacrificing
military capability. The two issues that DoD is seeking statutory relief are: [26, p6]
• DoD needs the flexibility to reduce physical capacity through a process like the
BRAC legislation used to reduce excess base structure associated with the
post-Cold War drawdown of U.S. forces.
• DoD is required by statue (10 USC Section 2466) to perform 60 percent of
depot maintenance activities in public depots. Relief from this provision would
enable DoD to contract out functions that do not support core capabilities and
that can be performed less expensively by private-sector firms.
The QDR closes their report by emphasizing their focus on ensuring the U.S.
military is able to fight and win the nation's wars. They note that a robust and modern
infrastructure is essential to this end. However, DoD states 'it is clear that further
reductions are possible, and must be made in order to support training, modernization, and
operational requirements at less cost." [26, p6]
F. THE GAO REPORTS EXCESS DEPOT CAPACITY
The General Accounting Office (GAO) reported in 1996 that the DoD depot
system had 40- 45 percent excess capacity, at the time of the 1995 BRAC. This is based
on an analysis of maximum potential capacity for a five-day week, one eight-hour-per-day
shift operation. [43, p5] This GAO report was extremely critical of DoD's efforts to
privatize-in-place the Sacramento and San Antonio Air Logistics Centers. Their analysis
indicated that it will prove much more cost-effective to close those facilities and reallocate
the work to other depots or private-sector facilities having unutilized capacity. While
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DoD stated its plan reflects concerns about the near-term costs of the closures and the
potential effects on local communities and Air Force readiness. The GAO projected
savings of approximately $182 million annually through transferring the centers' workload
to existing depots that have tremendous excess capacity.
G. DEFENDING THE DEPOTS
The CORM, DSB, and QDR were not received by all with the same enthusiasm.
There are several entities, motivated by different reasons, who were very skeptical of these
reports.
1. GAO Investigates Depot Outsourcing
The GAO analyzed DoD's maintenance policy and workload analysis, as required
by Section 311 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY96. Their preliminary
findings are as follows: [43, p9]
First, it provides an overall framework for managing DoD
depot maintenance activities. Second, it sets forth a clear preference
for moving workload to the private-sector, which will likely result in
a much smaller core capability than exists today. Third, it is not
consistent with congressional guidance in one key area—the use of
public-private competitions. Fourth, the policy provides substantial
latitude in implementation. As a result, the precise affect of this
policy on such factors as public-private mix, cost, and excess
capacity remain uncertain.
The second and third observations are very significant. DoD has now stated a
preference for privatizing maintenance support for new systems and for outsourcing non-
core workload. DoD is changing their method of identifying core. Core no longer means
that primarily DoD depots will perform wartime work. Now, DoD's core concept is for
its depots to perform maintenance requirements that the Service secretaries identify as too
risky for the private-sector to perform. DoD's policy subscribes to maintaining only
'minimum capability" which does not necessarily mean a workload for a depot. The
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Services will conduct risk assessments, identifying readiness, sustainability, and
technology, to determine if the work should be made available for competition within the
private-sector GAO states that it is unclear as to the extent measured criteria or
subjective judgment will be used for the assessments.
When GAO stated that DoD's policy is inconsistent with Congressional guidance,
they are referring to the DoD policy to engage in public-private competition for workloads
in excess of core only when it determines 'there is not adequate competition from private-
sector firms alone." "Under this policy, DoD depots would be used sparingly for public-
private competitions and DoD depots cannot compete for any non-core workloads, where
adequate private-sector competition exists, even though the DoD depots could offer the
most cost-effective source of repair." [43, pll] In addition, DoD is now considering
privatizing intermediate maintenance of DoD weapons and equipment. These functions
have traditionally been considered core. [38, pll]
DoD's push to privatize is based upon an underlying assumption that privatization
will result in 20 percent savings and these savings will be available to support the Services'
modernization programs. DoD's assumption is based on the CORM report. The 1995
CORM did suggest that 20 percent savings could result from the privatization of depot
maintenance and they made the recommendation that DoD implement this costs saving
effort. The commission's proposal was to reject the notion of core; to outsource all new
support requirements, particularly the depot-level logistics support of new and future
weapon systems; and establish a time-phased plan to privatize essentially all existing
depot-level maintenance. The DoD agreed with most of the CORM. However, they
noted in their response to Congress that they must retain a limited core depot maintenance
capability to meet essential wartime surge demands, promote competition, and sustain
institutional expertise.
When the GAO investigated the CORM' s findings, they discovered that the
CORM had based the 20 percent on reports of projected savings from public/private
competitions for various commercial activities as part of the implementation of OMB
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Circular A-76. These commercial activities 'included various base operating support
functions, such as family housing, real property, and vehicle maintenance, civilian
personnel administration, food service, security and law enforcement, and other support
services While these activities were varied in nature, they had similarities in that they
generally involved low-skilled labor, required little capital investment; generally involved
routine, repetitious tasks that could readily be identified in a statement-of-work; and had
many private- sector offerors who were interested and had the capability to perform the
work. [43, pl3-14]
The GAO reviewed A-76 competitions and public-private competitions for depot-
level maintenance and found that the 20 percent projected savings were not achieved.
Specifically, GAO found that: [43, pl4-15]
• In situations where public-private competitions for DoD depot maintenance
were held, reengineered public activities won 67 percent of the non-ship
competitions based on cost.
• There were inherent problems writing concise statements of work for the
complex depot activities The modifications to the statements ofwork resulted
in cost increases for privatized work.
• The A-76 competitions cost savings were not directly quantifiable. They did
not consider several costing factors such as, the cost of the competition or the
administration of the contract. When public contracts were audited, savings
were often less than projected. The contracts that were won by public bids
averaged 40 percent less than the lowest private-sector bid.
• There was not an abundance of private-sector competitors willing to place
bids The A-76 was basing their estimated savings for public-private
competitions on situations involving four or more private offerors. Of the
competitions reviewed, 22 had no private offerors, and 33 had only one Only
28 of the competitions had three or more private offerors.
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To further investigate the use of competitive procedures for outsourcing of DoD's
depot maintenance, GAO selected 240 of the 8,452 depot maintenance contracts awarded
during 1995. The 240 contracts were valued at $4.3 billion. GAO's investigation
revealed: (1) 182, or 76 percent, of the contracts were awarded through sole-source
negotiation, (2) 49, or 20 percent were awarded through full and open competition, and
(3) nine, or four percent were awarded through limited competition The full and open
competition contracts accounted for 51 percent of the total dollar value and the 182 sole-
source contracts accounted for 45 percent of the dollar value.
The GAO's investigation discovered that the majority of the contracts went to a
small number of contractors. The 240 contracts were awarded to 71 contractors, 13 of
these contractors were awarded 76 percent of the $4.3 billion. Three of these 13
contractors had been awarded $1.3 billion of the workload. [43, pi 6]
The analysis also revealed that the private-sector was more competitive for certain
items than others. Common type items such as trucks, ground vehicles, engines, and
airframes were often competitive. For other, military-unique, items such as fire control
systems, communications and radar equipment, and electronic components, the buying
commands used both the public and private-sector sources for repair of limited items. The
GAO examined 414 of the items repaired by both the public and private-sectors to make
price comparisons. 'For 62 percent of the items, the contract price was higher than the
price for the same item repaired in a DoD depot." [43, pi 7]
Another issue that has caused much debate is DoD's desire to privatize-in-place
vice consolidate the existing public depot maintenance facilities. As stated earlier, DoD's
depots currently average 40 percent excess capacity. This excess capacity has been
addressed through the BRAC process. In the depot's heydays of the late 1970's, the U.S.
Army had 10 active depots in the continental United States and two in Europe. 'Table 1 .
1
identifies the five remaining Army depot-level maintenance activities, provides a general
description of each depot's workload, and highlights the potential affect of the
implementation ofBRAC decisions." [42, p3-4]
27
However, DoD plans to privatize-in-place tactical missile and Paladin self-
propelled artillery systems that are currently maintained by the public-sector at
Letterkenny Army Depot and will privatize non-core vehicle and equipment currently
maintained at the Red River Army Depot. This plan is causing the GAO to be concerned
regarding excess capacity that is not being sufficiently reduced by privatizing-in-place.
They estimate that DoD's current plan will increase the excess capacity from 42 percent to
46 percent The GAO reports that privatization-in-place actually privatizes excess
capacity and creates excess capacity conditions in the private-sector. They charge that
opportunities exist to significantly reduce the cost of depot maintenance by transferring
workloads from closing and downsizing depots, rather than privatizing-in-place. This
workload transfer will improve utilization and decrease of operations at the remaining
1995 BRAC Effect on Depot System
DEPOT WORKLOAD POTENTIAL AFFECT
DESCRIPTION FROM BRAC 1995
Anniston, Heavy Tracked Combat Receive combat vehicle
Alabama Vehicles & Small Arms workload from Letterkenny
and Red River Army Depot
Corpus Chnsti, Rotary Wing Aircraft No Affect
Texas and associated equipment
Letterkenny, Towed & Self propelled artillery Terminate depot maintenance,
Pennsylvania tactical missile systems tactical missile guidance systems,
workload to Tobyhanna Army
Depot or to private-sector, combat
vehicles workload to Anniston
Army Depot
Red River. Light to medium combat Downsize maintenance operations
Texas vehicles; wheeled tactical retain Bradley family of vehicles
vehicles and troop support including Multiple Launch
equipment. Rocket System, transfer remaining
workload to Anniston Army Depot
or private-sector.
Tobyhanna, Communications and Receive ground communications/
Pennsylvania electronics systems electronics from Sacramento Air
Logistics Center and missile
workload from Letterkenny Army
Depot
TABLE 1 . 1 Source Ref: 42, p4
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facilities. Finally, the GAO raises questions about how DoD plans to comply with
statutory requirements such as 10 U.S. C. 2469 which requires competition subsequent to
privatizing depot maintenance workloads valued at not less than $3 million." [42, p6]
2. The Congressional Depot Caucus Voices Concern
The researcher had the opportunity to interview former Congressman Glen
Browder, who was the both co-chairman of the House Depot Caucus and the
representative for the Congressional district of the ANAD. [5] Congressman Browder
emphasized during the interview that the whole privatization/outsourcing discussion was a
misguided debate. He wanted to ensure it was clearly understood that the scenario was
not a bunch of parochial politicians seeking pork for their district versus the well-meaning,
war-fighting, uniformed members of the Pentagon. He said although this is the popular
picture, nothing could be further from the truth. He asked the rhetorical question: 'Where
do these political appointees, who are pushing for privatization/outsourcing, come from?"
— defense contractors — 'Where will they go back to after their term has ended?" —
defense contractors.
Congressman Browder said the House Depot Caucus is 'politically suspicious"
that privatization/outsourcing is not truly in the interest of the 'fighting men and women."
He said he had spoken with 'War-fighters" who feared privatization/outsourcing depot-
level maintenance and repair. He further commented that the Depot Caucus was
interested in doing what is right for our country: the war-fighter and the taxpayer.
Congressman Browder was able to quote GAO findings regarding DoD being unable to
'prove" cost-savings available through privatization/outsourcing depot-level maintenance
and repair. He said it is too easy for defense contractors to submit faulty estimates and
'buy-in" to the depot contracts. He also pointed out the lack of actual competition in
previously competed depot maintenance contracts.
Congressman Browder expressed concerns regarding the responsiveness and
ability to control cost of the private-sector. He raised questions regarding the private-
29
sectors' ability to strike or possibly go out of business. He expressed concerns that if the
private-sector wanted to go out of business, the government could be forced to subsidize
the private-sector at a cost that is higher than the current price.
In concluding the interview, Congressman Browder emphatically stressed that,
'Certain core functions a Nation should always maintain control of. (The Depot Caucus)
doesn't fight privatization as a whole, only politically-motivated campaign contributions."
H. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN GDLS AND ANAD
GDLS and ANAD are both in the business of supporting the Abrams Main Battle
Tank (MBT) ANAD has been the Army's primary source for depot-level maintenance
and repair for MBTs since its establishment in 1942. ANAD is located in Anniston,
Alabama It encompass 25 square miles of land and employs 2,647 personnel They
specialize in their capability to design, manufacture and refurbish tracked-vehicle
components. Due to their high standards of quality, ANAD is designated as the Center of
Technical Excellence for the Ml Abrams MBT and the designated candidate depot for
several other tracked-vehicles. GDLS is headquartered in Sterling Heights, Michigan.
They have facilities scattered throughout the U.S. that specialize in the design,
manufacturing, assembly and support of armored weapon systems and electronic products
for the U.S. Army and U.S. Marine Corps and a number of allied nations. They possess
55 years experience, employ 3,500 personnel, and operate several large facilities dedicated
to various portions of their organization's mission. GDLS has produced the Abrams since
their purchase of the tank-building subsidiary of Chrysler in 1982. Chrysler Corporation
had also manufactured the predecessor to the Ml Abrams, the M60 series. GDLS also
operates the Government-owned Lima, Ohio facilities where the Ml Abrams was
produced.
The Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP) was originally established to support tank
repair for WW II and was subsequently laid-away until it was reactivated and modernized
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for the production of the Ml in 1977. The LATP is situated on 400 acres, with 800,000
square feet of dedicated manufacturing space.
GDLS and ANAD have worked together to capitalize on their comparative
advantages In the early 1990's the LATP and ANAD began working together to upgrade
older Ml Abrams to the M1A2 configuration. This operation entails ANAD
disassembling the older Mi's, rebuilding major components, and shipping the hulls and
rebuilt components to LATP for reassembly and integration of the A2 upgrades.
In addition to their work together on the M1A2 upgrade and the AIM XXI
project, GDLS has entered into an Interservice Support Agreement through the Tank-
Automotive Command (TACOM) for the lease of 20,000 square feet of workspace from
ANAD. GDLS now performs work on the Gunner's Primary Sight (GPS) of the Ml
Abrams in the ANAD facilities.
This collocation of public and private workers could invite suspicions of
encroachment and job insecurity. When interviewing Congressman Browder and an
ANAD business planner, the researcher asked about the reaction of ANAD's unionized
labor force to the defense contractors coming to work at the ANAD facilities. Both
responded that initially there was a great deal of agitation among the union workers. The
union workers expressed fear of lost jobs and ultimately the privatization of ANAD. They
expressed a belief that the Government had "let the fox into the hen house." However,
after local politicians and ANAD management showed the workforce that the influx of
funds from the lease and the use of excess capacity was actually in the best interest for
ANAD, the fears subsided and there has been little resistance past the initial hump.
I. CHAPTER SUMMARY
There are many issues surrounding the support of the U.S. Military's weapon
systems These issues are highly-complex, and they involve political, personal and
legislative agendas. The statutes and policies governing the PPC often conflict or are
overly burdensome Therefore these issues are not likely to be resolved in the near future.
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Too many of the individuals involved in making policy behave as though the
question of who should provide support to the military weapon systems is an "all or
nothing" wager. This attitude is extremely divisive and only leads to a stagnation or
stalemate While this attitude may help defend turf, it does nothing to free-up desperately
needed modernization dollars for our aging fleet.
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III. THE Ml ABRAMS, PARTNERING, AND THE AIM XXI PROJECT
A. INTRODUCTION
The military might and true shock affect of armored vehicles was fully realized, for
the first time, during WW II. Both the German and the Allied Forces successfully turned
the tide of many battles through the use of tanks. The MBTs of today are significantly
more sophisticated than those of WW II. Today's MBTs possess integrated software
(SW), infrared Thermal Imaging Systems (TIS), digital display panels, and the ability to
acquire and kill targets from an unclassified distance of 3,500 meters, while on the move.
The purpose of this chapter is threefold. First, to provide the reader with
background on the development, fielding, and support of the Ml Abrams. Second, to
introduce the reader to the partnering concept Last, provide the reader with an
understanding of the AIM XXI project
B. THE Ml ABRAMS MBT
1. Development
The Ml program was established in December 1971. It was originally designated
the XM1 to signify its experimental status. In February 1972, the Army activated a task
force consisting of the user, trainer, and developer participating in the concept exploration
for the new MBT.
In June 1973, two companies were awarded contracts for prototype development.
Each contractor had to develop a MBT that met all operational requirements with a unit
cost of not more than $507,790, in FY72 dollars. The Defense Division of Chrysler
Corporation (now GDLS) was awarded a contract worth $68.1 million. The Detroit
Diesel Allison Division of General Motors Corporation was awarded a contract worth $88
million. In February 1976, both companies submitted prototypes to the Army for
operational and engineering testing. In November 1976, the SECDEF announced that the
Chrysler Corporation had been selected to enter Full-Scale Engineering Development
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(FSED) FSED has since been renamed: Engineering Manufacturing and Development
(EMD)
Chrysler's three-year FSED contract was worth $196.2 million. During this time
they produced 1 1 XM1 pilot vehicles and the associated spares at the Government Owned
- Contractor Operated (GOCO) Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant.
When Chrysler sold their Defense Division to General Dynamics in March 1982,
Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP) was reactivated and upgraded for the production of the
Ml. The Army's original intent was to procure 3,312 Mis at a cost of $4,900 million.
After two subsequent changes, the procurement goal grew to 7,467 Mis by the end of
FY88 This caused the tank manufacturing facilities to double production during their
second year of manufacturing, from 30 per month to 60. This increased production rate
was sustained until January 1984.
2. Ml Improvements and Upgrades
When GDLS switched production to the Improved Ml, in 1985, they had
produced 2,374 Ml tanks. The Improved Ml was followed by the Ml Al. The MlAl's
first production run was completed in August 1985 and continued until early 1993. After
delivery of the first 299 MlAls in April 1991 the Detroit Arsenal Tank Plant operations
were discontinued. At this time, between the two tank plants, 7,467 MBTs had been
delivered Production of Ml Als continued at LATP. In December of 1992 the SECDEF
authorized Phase I to upgrade 210 Mis to the enhanced M1A2 configuration. Phase I
called for GDLS to deliver four prototype vehicles and 206 production vehicles
Production was scheduled from October 1994 through September 1996.
The U.S. Army funded $7 4 billion for the M1A2 upgrade program. Their goal
was to field a total of 1,079 MlA2s. Additionally, 792 Mis were scheduled for upgrade
to M1A2 configuration from September 1996 through 2003. This schedule, if successfully
funded, represented an average of 120 Mis going through upgrade per year, the minimum
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3. Proven Capabilities and Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
GDLS does engage in FMS with allies of the U.S. The Ml is a sought-after
weapon system This is especially true after its documented success during operations in
South West Asia (SWA). Mis have been sold to Egypt, Saudi Arabia, and Kuwait. The
Ml has unarguably proven itself capable of thriving in the most austere environments.
After the operations in SWA, the DoD released provisional information on the
performance of some key weapon systems. The following are extracts on the Ml MBT:
[13,pl38]
After 1 00 hours of offensive operations, the operational readiness
rates for both the VII Corps and the XVIII Airborne Corps exceeded the
Army's 90 percent standard. Especially noteworthy was the night move by
the 3rd Armored Division covering 200 km (120 miles). None of the more
than 300 tanks in the division broke down.
Seven separate M1A1 crews reported being hit by T-72 tank
rounds These MlAls sustained no damage, attesting to the effectiveness
of our heavy armor. Other crews reported that the M1A1 thermal sight
allowed them to acquire Iraqi T-72s through the smoke from the oil well
fires and other obscurants. The T-72 did not have the same advantage.
This situation gave the Abrams a significant edge in survivability,
engagement range, and night maneuver. Additionally tank crews reported
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that the M829A1 tank round was extremely effective against the 1-12. In
sum, the combined performance of the Abrams armor, thermal sight and
ammunition attest to the systems' exceptional lethality and survivability.
Of the 1,955 M1A1 Abrams tanks in theater, four were disabled
and four were damaged but are repairable. No Ml Al crew members were
killed by enemy fire in the many tank engagements.
Although the Ml has performed marvelously since its inception in 1971, it was
designed for a service life of only 20 years. The Ml is fast approaching the end of its
intended service life. However, due to the shrinking defense budgets and subsequent
decreasing modernization dollars, the successor to the Ml, the Block III MBT, was
canceled With the cancellation of the Block III there are no definitive plans for a follow-
on to the M1A2 Therefore, the Army made the decision to extend the service life of the
Ml from 20 years to 40 years.
4. Depot-Level Maintenance of the Ml MBT
The Ml is a modular design and was not originally intended to go through depot-
level maintenance as a complete system. However, in the mid 1980's, the Army realized
the need for the capacity to overhaul Mis that had been damaged in hostile encounters.
To accommodate this overhaul capability the Army developed the Depot Maintenance
Work Requirements (DMWR) for the Ml which serves as a repair manual for depot-level
maintenance and repair. They also invested in the personnel training and equipment pre-
requisite to conduct this task at the depot-level.
C. PARTNERING
1. Introduction
The concept of partnering is relatively new and is being constantly expanded. It
was originally thought of as just a way to facilitate Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR).
However, due to its unlimited possibilities, it has quickly grown into its current, but
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evolving state. Partnering is not a contractual relationship. It is two or more separate
entities agreeing to jointly work together to complete a task. The partnering arrangement
is sought to capture the comparative advantages of the separate business units. The
organizations involved must collectively determine where their individual strengths reside,
and which organization can most efficiently provide the service or produce the product.
The arrangement must be focused on the knowledge that the partnership has a synergistic
effect for all parties involved. Trust and open communications are absolutely necessary
for a partnership to succeed. The partners must invest in up-front, early communications
to clearly define the roles, missions, and the end-state goals of the partnership. These
early meeting will greatly decrease the amount of later misunderstandings as the project
matures. To best ensure that all parties, especially senior management, are 'bought-in" to
the outcome of these early meetings, it is recommended to capture the results of these
early meetings in either a mission statement for the key participants, or a
charter/memorandum of agreement signed by senior management from all parties of the
partnership. [3, p24-27]
Acquisition Reform (AR) has greatly facilitated the Federal Government's ability
to partner with private-industry Prior to AR, public facilities were viewed as
incompatible with private-industry. Now, many DoD agencies have proven the opposite
to be true. By establishing successful partnerships and teaming arrangements with what
were once thought to be their most feared competitors, they have proven that the public
and private sectors can work together to create "win - win" opportunities. [24]
The Army Materiel Command (AMC) has written a handbook for promoting
successful partnering arrangements. This handbook is used as the primary source of
information throughout this section of Chapter III. Throughout the handbook, they place
tremendous emphasis on communication and teamwork. AMC states 'partnering is an
essential component of the AMC ADR program, aimed at avoiding contract disputes
before they impact contract performance." [15]
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The Honorable Gilbert F. Decker, Former Assistant Secretary of the Army (RDA)
promoted partnering by saying: [16]
Partnering is a natural extension of the Integrated Product Team
concept. It provides a flexible framework for government and industry
team members to work together to solve problems and informally resolve
disputes. This helps reduce program costs and speeds the fielding of Army
equipment.
To paraphrase the late, great Vince Lombardi—Partnering isn't
everything; it's the only thing.
2. Goals and Benefits of a Partnering Arrangements
The handbook provides many useful guidelines for fostering a successful
partnering arrangement. More importantly, the handbook lets the reader know what they
have to gain from a partnering arrangement They do this by clearly defining the major
goals and objectives of the partnering arrangement and identifying some of the benefits
that have already been realized. Figure 3.2, taken from the AMC Partnering handbook,
illustrates some of the benefits and attitudinal changes that a healthy partnering
arrangement can foster. In this same section there are three quotes that very simply and
eloquently explain the partnering arrangement. [15]
1) Partnering is primarily an attitude adjustment where the parties to the
contract form a relationship of teamwork, cooperation, and good faith
performance. Partnering requires the parties to look beyond the strict
bounds of the contract to develop this cooperative working relationship
which promotes their common goals and objectives.
2) Partnering constitutes a mutual commitment by the parties on how they
will interact during the course of the contract, with the primary objective of
facilitating improved contract performance through enhanced
communications.
3) Government and Industry must work together, communicate their
expectations, agree on common goals and methods of performance, and
identify and resolve problems early on ~ or risk bringing both partners to
the ground
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There are many possible benefits that should evolve as a result of the partnering
arrangement The following is a list of these benefits along with a concise explanation.
[17]
• Partnering establishes mutual goals and objectives.
A common focus on mutual goals and objectives encourages all parties
involved to seek "win-win" solutions to situations as they occur The realization
that all parties' ultimate success or failure is dependent upon everyone else's
success or failure, fosters an environment focused on the success of the team.
The Bridge to Partnership
Separate Government &
Contractor Teams





• Separate goals &
objectives





• Common goals & objectives
Figure 3.2 Source: Ref: 17
• Partnering builds trust and encourages open communication.
As the partners begin to understand each other and communicate honestly
and openly, trust and mutual respect should grow. This dynamic is cultivated by
the frequent interactions of all parties, early-on, while they are working together to
develop their contractual relationship.
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• Partnering helps eliminate surprises.
Surprises frequently result in costly schedule slips and often lead to
disputes and litigation. An environment in which the partners frequently
communicate and have developed a mutual respect and trust for each other is likely
to mitigate many surprises.
• Partnering enables the parties to anticipate and resolve problems.
Unknowns exist in all projects. This is especially true as we constantly
expand the envelope of technology. What ultimately defines any team is how they
react to adversity The partnering arrangement encourages all parties to "own" the
problem instead of looking for ways to 'blame the other guy." During early
discussions of the project, the partners will work together to identify the unknowns
and develop contingency plans to deal with the unknowns as they occur. Having
all partners involved in this process helps ensure that the project is viewed from
multiple angles, this greatly enhances the probability of identifying the most
unknowns early. Known-unknowns are dangerous, but planned for. However,
unknown-unknowns, have surprise on their side and can inflict catastrophic
damage on a project.
• Partnering avoids disputes through informal conflict management procedures.
One of the suggested steps for forming a partnership is developing a
mutually agreed upon conflict resolution process. This identifies the roles and
responsibilities of the Government and Industry to elevate issues through the
appropriate organizational levels to avoid inaction and personality conflicts.
• Partnering avoids litigation through the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution.
As the partners seek to achieve 'Win-win" solutions, identify unknowns
early, and resolve conflicts informally, the necessity for litigation in administrative
and judicial forums is minimized.
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• Partnering reduces paperwork.
The partnering arrangement concentrates on successful contract
performance rather than case building and documenting for documentation's sake
• Partnering reduces the time and cost of contract performance.
Due to the focus on honest communications and raising issues early in the
process, parties involved in a partnering arrangement have experienced that they
are able to meet or exceed schedule requirements and avoid costly mistakes and
rework.
• Partnering reduces administration and oversight.
A combination of increased communication and empowerment to make
decisions at lower levels, will reduce the necessity for layers of administration and
oversight.
• Partnering improves safety.
All parties taking joint responsibility for ensuring workplace safety for both
contractor and Government employees will reduce safety hazards and avoid
workplace accidents.
• Partnering improves engineering efforts.
The partnering process streamlines engineering activities and the value
engineering process. Through streamlining and expediting these processes the
participants will see the results of their actions more quickly. This will reinforce
the importance of these activities and encourage them to more aggressively pursue
value-added engineering efforts.
• Partnering improves morale and promotes professionalism in the workplace.
Since partnering encourages empowerment, open communications, and
establishment of common goals, the parties involved are more likely to feel a sense
of ownership, which ultimately leads to improved morale.
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• Partnering generates harmonious business relations.
Partnering requires all parties to agree on a common charter to work
together, through thick and thin, toward the accomplishment of the projects goals.
The knowledge that you are in this together, to the bitter end, relieves many of the
stresses of a normal joint venture and fosters a more harmonious relationship.
• Partnering focuses on the mutual interests of the parties.
Partnering foregoes the normal process of the parties separately developing
their goals and objectives for the union, and then later meeting to negotiate the
"team's" goals and objectives. Partnering encourages the parties to jointly develop
the projects" goals and objectives which will also satisfy the partners goals and
objectives. Foregoing position-based negotiation, which usually is not "win-win"
focused, allows the parties to see each other as partners from the beginning.
Although there are many benefits associated with a partnering arrangement, it is
not mandatory. Partnering requires personal commitment by all parties involved,
especially senior management. Since personal commitment and cultural change cannot be
mandated, voluntary acceptance is imperative. Partnering is not a one-way street. It
cannot work if all parties are not committed to the achievement of the mutual goals and
objectives of the partnership Partnering is a business opportunity. There could not be a
business opportunity without an associated business risk. Senior managers within both the
Government and Industry must understand this and be willing to commit the requisite
resources for ensuring success of the partnership Entering into a partnering arrangement
does not signify a waiver of the parties' contractual rights and it is not inconsistent with
any acquisition-related statutes or regulations. Also, partnering is not contrary to the
Government's business interest. The goal of the acquisition process is to efficiently,
effectively, and economically procure quality systems, supplies, and services for the user.
[19]
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3. Critical Elements of a Successful Partnering Arrangement
Although each partnership will be tailored to best fit the needs of the involved
parties, the handbook identifies six elements which are imperative to a successful
partnering arrangement The following is a list of these six critical elements along with a
concise explanation. [18]
• Preparation.
The parties entering into a partnering arrangement must understand the
partnering process and believe that it can only improve on the current way of doing
business. Partnering requires cultural change and will only flourish in those
organizations prepared to accept the changes. All parties involved must be willing
to allocate the up-front investments necessary for long-term benefit realization.
• Commitment.
A demonstrated unwavering commitment by all parties involved, especially
senior managers, is critical to the success of the partnering process. This
commitment must be communicated both internal and external of the parties and
all parties must be committed to the success of each other.
• Inclusion of appropriate parties.
Team formation is critical to the processes success. In forming the
partnering team, you must involve everyone who can impact the performance of
the contract. 'The partners must carefully choose which organizational elements
will be represented as well as which specific individuals should participate." Also,
the participation of subcontractors, users, and contract administration personnel
must be considered.
• Clear definition of the roles.
'Participants in the Partnering process must fully understand and accept
their specific roles and responsibilities and be empowered with the requisite
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decision-making authority in order for the Partnering arrangement to be
successful."
• Use of the Partnering tools.
The handbook identifies the following tools to use throughout contract








• Reinforcement and follow-up.
After establishing goals, objectives, and a performance baseline, the parties
must regularly meet to reinforce the goals and objectives and measure their
performance against the baseline.
4. AMC's Partnering Model
AMC has developed a Model in order to facilitate the Partnering Process. Figure
3 3 depicts that model. The model addresses four crucial steps in the partnering process.
The following is a discussing of the four steps AMC has identified in the partnering
process.
• Getting Started. [22]
The partnering process can be applied to any action involving contractual
performance. However, all parties must be fully-committed to the partnership.
Anyone can recommend using the partnering process by identifying the benefits to
the PCO or the Program Manager (PM). The following quotes clearly define the
most suitable organizations to consider partnering.
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Partnering is most beneficial when the parties believe that
traditional contract administration methods may prove to be ineffective,
particularly in a downsizing environment.
Partnering is particularly valuable to organizations committed to
DoD acquisition streamlining and cycle-time reduction, and for those
seeking a process that identifies and resolves problems early and without
the need for costly and time-consuming litigation
Figure 3.3 Source Ref: 22
In selecting a contract to partner, experience has proven that contracts best
suited for success are technically complex; involve several major players, are for
the acquisition of critical items; or anticipate identifiable problems. The handbook
suggests that cases in which the contractor and Government have had adversarial
relations are excellent candidates for partnering. The partnering process is best
45
applied to contracts of a two-year or longer duration, unless the parties are
experienced in the partnering process.
Commitment to the partnership by all stakeholders is imperative. The
arrangement must have senior management and those who are critical to program
success, within Government and Industry, supporting and advocating the
partnership. The partnering arrangement must be nurtured through periodic
meetings to reinforce the commitment of stakeholders and introduction of any new
members to the partnering process. The participants in the partnership must be
empowered to make binding decision for their areas of responsibility. This level of
trust is fundamental to the streamlining and trust which partnering is developed to
produce.
AMC suggests that each party designate "champions" of the partnership.
These champions should be senior, high-profile individuals whose influence and
power can reinforce the organization's commitment to the partnership. Their
responsibilities will include overseeing the project, reinforcing the team approach,
overcoming resisting forces, participating in resolution of issues escalated to their
level, celebrating success, and maintaining a positive image for the project.
• Communicating with Industry. [23]
Again, anyone can recommend application of the partnering process.
However, the Government should extend an invitation to partner early in the
acquisition process. The handbook suggests a good opportunity for AMC
organizations to express their desire to partner, is at Advance Planning Briefings
for Industry (APBI). APBIs is a forum where Government representatives
describe current and future acquisition programs to prospective contractors. The
handbook also urges the Government to thoroughly explain the partnering
concept, as it may be the first time some of the contractors have been introduced
to it. The procuring activities should begin discussing their desire to partner at the
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pre-solicitation conference and ensure that the partnership be an agenda item at the
post-award conference.
• Conducting the Workshop and Developing the Charter. [20]
The handbook suggests that, in most cases, the use of a facilitator-directed
workshop will help ease the parties through the transition to becoming partners.
The facilitator is a neutral party who acts as an honest-broker to get the parties
organized and helps lead the parties through the partnering workshop. The
facilitator is instrumental in assisting the partners in the development of their
Charter, identification of potential problems, and development of the Conflict
Escalation Procedure (CEP).
Preparation is critical to the success of the workshop. The degree of
success achieved during the workshop is usually directly proportional to the
amount of effort the parties invest into preparation for the workshop. The
facilitator can assist the parties during their preparation. In fact, it is recommended
that the facilitator be involved in the parties preparation for the workshop. If the
parties are new to the partnering process, the facilitator can assist in keeping them
focused on the partnering process. It also increases the facilitator's understanding
of contract terms and issues. This understanding of both sides will enhance the
facilitator's ability to aid the parties through the tough issues during the workshop.
It is important to include, in both the workshop and preparatory training,
all the individuals necessary for the partnership to succeed. It is important that
everyone understand the goals of the partnering process and have a clear
understanding of the impact this arrangement will have on their roles and
responsibilities. Another reason to include all potential players in the preparatory
training is this is the time the parties separately review the contract and identify
potential problems which may arise during contract performance. If all the
functional experts are not involved in both the preparatory training and the
workshop, these problems may manifest themselves at times when it is much more
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costly and time-consuming to fix. It will also likely lead to the parties doubting
each others professionalism and ability to complete the task.
It is best to choose a neutral site to conduct the workshop. The neutral site
removes all distracters associated with being at one's normal place of work, does
not make one parties feel as though the other has the 'home court advantage," and
enhances the team-building environment.
The partnering workshop's purpose is to conduct team-building, initiate the
partnering process, and create the momentum to drive the partners toward the
accomplishment of mutual goals and objectives throughout the contract
performance The workshop is a critical, up-front investment in the partnership
that should produce many long-term benefits. The length of the workshop
depends on the complexity of the contract, experience of the participants in
Partnering, the number of partners, and the time needed for team-building. There
are six deliverables which the workshop should produce.
1) The Partnering Charter, (mission statement, goals, and objectives)
2) Specific program issues and concerns, with an Action Plan developed
for each.
3) Conflict Escalation Procedure.
4) Alternative Dispute Resolution approach.
5) Metrics for the assessment of accomplishments
6) Reinforcement techniques.
• Making it Happen. [21]
Partnering, like most things, if left unattended and unnurtured, dies. All of
the individuals involved in the workshop must not forget or abandon the strides
made during the workshop. The parties must trust the products of the workshop,
follow agreed upon procedures, frequently communicate with their counterparts,
and make decisions which are mutually beneficial to all parties of the partnership.
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Although a deliverable from the workshop was specific program issues and
concerns, with an action plan developed for each, it is improbable that all potential
problems were identified. It is also important to understand that obstacles will
occur, however, they should not be seen as insurmountable if the parties use open
and honest communication to breech them. The parties must capitalize on the
synergism of their arrangement to solve problems. When confronted with a
problem, they must foster a positive attitude, avoid blame, avoid surprises, seek
mutual accountability for problem resolution, and embrace change.
Periodic reviews are a necessary component of partnering. These reviews
should be at regular intervals, not just when problems have occurred. These
periodic reviews can involve assessment of the partnering arrangement, follow-up
on workshop issues, or devising metrics for measuring the success of the
partnering process These reviews may address single or multiple issues.
Changes and corrections are a natural bi-product of any relationship.
These changes and corrections should not be viewed as indication of failure or
error They must simply be learned from, applied, and documented.
Another important part of nurturing the partnership is ensuring that success
is measured and celebrated. This reinforces the goals and benefits of the
partnering arrangement and provides additional momentum for future successes.
Now that the groundwork is laid to establish that there is a clear need for a
M1A1 sustainment program, and the goals, benefits, and critical elements of
partnering have been examined. The next section looks at how the Army and





AIM XXI is an acronym for Abrams Integrated Management for the Twenty-first
Century. It is a joint effort; pooling the resources of PM Abrams, the Tank-Automotive
and Armaments Command (TACOM), GDLS, and ANAD. The purpose of the program
is to extend the service life of the Ml Al, reduce the Operation and Support (O&S) costs
associated with an aging fleet, insert information management, and maintain an organic
industrial base.
The AIM XXI process is similar to the M1A2 upgrade program, however, the
process is tailored to the M1A1 requirements. In both the AIM XXI and the M1A2
programs, the MBTs are inducted into the process at ANAD where both the hull and
turret are completely disassembled. The majority of hull, turret, and subassembly rebuild
processes occur at ANAD, supported by GDLS, the Army Supply System, the Defense
Logistics Agency (DLA), and vendors. Components found unacceptable for rebuild to
new manufacturing tolerances/performance will be replaced with new material. The
components which are not designated for rebuild by ANAD go to either GDLS, vendors,
or other depots The major divergence between the M1A2 upgrade and the AIM XXI
M1A1, is the electrical components. The M1A2 receives all new electrical components,
including the insertion of digital Line Replaceable Units (LRUs), while the AIM XXI
M1A1 only receives all modification necessary to make it current with the final M1A1
production run. After the components are rebuilt they are sent in kits or packages to
GDLS for further technology insertions, system reassembly, test, and final acceptance.
The AIM XXI program is divided into three phases to accommodate introduction
and proof of the program, required Force XXI capabilities, technology maturation, and the
Planning Programming and Budgeting system. The three phases are: Phase I, Proof of
Principle (PoP); Phase II, M1A1 Restoration with Technology Insertion; Phase III, M1A2
Restoration with Technology Insertion
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Phase I consist of proving the sustainment concept. Seventeen MlAls will be
processed through the AIM XXI process to a 'better than new" baseline configuration.
This AIM XXI Ml Al is considered better than new, because after it has been through the
AIM XXI process it will have not only been completely rebuilt to like-new tolerance, it
will have had all modifications and Engineering Change Proposals (ECPs) applied to it.
This base-lining to one standard M1A1 configuration is a significant undertaking. Since
1989, the M1A1 has had approximately 25,000 ECPs approved and 231 modification kits
issued. The PoP began June 1996 and ends December 1997 with the Army Materiel
Systems Analysis Activity (AMSAA) final test report. This 19-month period accounts for
the rebuild of the vehicles to AIM XXI standard; operating the AIM XXI vehicles through
National Training Center (NTC) rotations where they will log a minimum of 1,500 miles
of simulated warfare, and failure data collection and analysis.
Phase II consists of rebuilding the Ml Al to the baseline configuration identified in
Phase I, and insertion of those technologies that will improve its survivability to a level
comparable with the M1A2. Phase II is targeted to begin in FY98 and continue through
FY2015.
Phase III consist of integrating the M1A2 into the AIM XXI process. By FY2015,
the older MlA2s will be reaching their 20th year of service.
The AIM XXI concept was developed jointly by GDLS and ANAD. During the
first quarter FY 96, they marketed the concept, to the Program Executive Officer (PEO)
Ground Combat Support and Systems, the TACOM Commander, and the Depot Support
Command (DESCOM) Commander, in order to rally support. (It is important to note that
AMC's Partnering handbook was not written at the time ANAD and GDLS conceived and
marketed the AIM XXI project.) The project was successfully sold as a sustainment
program for reasons stated above. During January through March of 1996, GDLS and
ANAD worked together to develop a Statement of Work (SOW) and bill of materials.
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From March to June, GDLS submitted its proposal and on 14 June 1996 negotiated a $4.
1
million fixed-price contract with TACOM for the PoP.
The ultimate decision to pursue the ATM XXI process was based on many factors.
One of the principal driving factors was the seemingly uncontrollably cost of O&S for the
M1A1. Under current depot maintenance programs the O&S cost are projected to
increase by 44 percent, for inflation alone, over the next 20 years. Other factors include:
concern regarding the aging fleet's combat readiness, restructuring of Army doctrine from
prepositioned to force projection, which requires critical attention to sustainment issues;
the decision to extend the service life of the Ml Abrams; a shrinking public and private
industrial base; and the slow current Ml modernization process. In addition, it is cost
prohibitive to consider upgrading all Mis to the M1A2 configuration. Therefore, the
decision was made to upgrade only 1249 MlAls to M1A2 configuration.
TACOM made the decision to award the AIM XXI contract, sole-source, to
GDLS for numerous reasons. Among these are: [1]
• GDLS's intimate knowledge of the M1A1 MBT's, 25,000 ECPs, 231
modification kits, 14,000 drawings and 20,000 process sheets.
• GDLS's skilled and trained workforce.
• No competitive package. GDLS is the only source with system familiarity
adequate for technology insertions.
• Duplicative cost associated with duplicative facilities. Since GDLS is already
contracted for the MlA2 modification at the LATP, other facilities would have
to be identified and equipped for the AIM XXI project.
• GDLS's system is in-place, this significantly decreases the delay time and
learning curve associated with starting a new project.
• GDLS's proprietary process which includes special tooling and test equipment.
GDLS also owns six custom-designed weld robots that are critical to the
process.
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• GDLS's established material system of demonstrated venders, and economies
of scale.
• Costs of this magnitude could not be recovered in a competitive acquisition
• An indirect impact of the AIM XXI project is the ability for GDLS to spread
their operational overhead over more items. Thus, driving down the unit cost
of the Ml A2.
The AIM XXI PoP has performed as scheduled. Seventeen ATM MlAls were
delivered to the NTC at Fort Irwin, California, in January 1997, where they were worked
into the rotation cycle to achieve, or exceed, their 1,500 mile requirement. There have
been several In Process Reviews (IPRs) hosted by TACOM at the NTC; and AMSAA has
been steadily collecting data and comparing the cost-per-mile-operated information from
the AIM M 1A 1 s against the other M 1A 1 s at the NTC
.
2. What Makes AIM XXI a Partnering Arrangement?
The AIM XXI is considered a partnering arrangement for several reasons. First,
the concept was developed and marketed jointly by both organizations. The AIM project
represents the first time GDLS and ANAD have worked together in developing a SOW
and bill of materials. Plus, in contrast to the M1A2 program, the rebuilt components sent
to GDLS from ANAD are not viewed strictly as Government Furnished Material (GFM)
and are not covered by a Defective Government Materials (DGM) clause. This clause
covers GDLS's costs associated with the rework necessary to remove the defective
component and its replacement. Lastly, senior leadership from GDLS and ANAD signed
a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for shaping their arrangement during the AIM
process.
E. CHAPTER SUMMARY
This chapter has covered three diverse topics. However, all of these topics are
relevant and necessary to provide the reader with requisite knowledge. The topic of Ml
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Abrams MBT provides the reader with a basic understanding of the military importance,
lethality, development, and various configurations of the Abrams MBT. The Ml has
proven itself time and again to be a world-class combat vehicle and an essential part of the
U.S. Army's ground combat strategy. Also discussed in this section is the Army's
decision to extend the service life of the Ml, which provides an understanding of the need
for some type ofMl Al sustainment program
The discussion on partnering provides the reader with an understanding of the
various attributes of a partnering arrangement. It provides the reader with the possible
benefits of partnering arrangements. The model for partnering with industry provides the
participants with ideas and recommendations that should help them develop a successful
partnering arrangement. The theme that is repeated throughout this section is demand for
both full and open communication, and trust between the parties. Without these crucial
elements, it will be impossible for the partners to grow and develop; ultimately seeking
additional partnering opportunities.
The final section of the chapter provided background on the ATM XXI project; its
conception, the different phases of the project, and how a partnering arrangement between
GDLS and ANAD developed. It also explains how this relationship is unique to these
organizations and how this relationship actually impacted the contract between GDLS and
TACOM regarding the treatment of material furnished from ANAD.
Chapter IV is an analysis, using the ATM XXI as a case study, of the issues which
can arise when organizations pursue a partnering arrangement. The following are the
observations that the researcher will develop and support with the analysis of Chapter IV:
• Partnering is politically an 'easy pill to swallow," and allows for both a public
and private industrial base.
• Partnering is a natural step beyond Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).
• Communication must involve all key players necessary to make the partnering
arrangement successful.
• Partnering can save money, time, and other resources.
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Partnering arrangements between public and private operations can be difficult
to administer.
Partnering arrangements are difficult to sustain when expectations change.
Both parties must see long-term benefits in order to maintain long-term
partnering arrangements.
Partnering arrangements must have established metrics to measure success.
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IV. AIM XXI CASE ANALYSIS
A. INTRODUCTION
This chapter provides an analysis of the Abrams Integrated Management for the
Twenty-First Century (AIM XXI) project from a partnering perspective. The focus of this
chapter is on what we can learn from Anniston Army Depot's (ANAD) and General
Dynamics Land System's (GDLS) partnering arrangement during phase I of AIM XXI.
These issues (not all-inclusive) were derived from literature available, personal and e-mail
interviews with program personnel, depot personnel, program integrators, and contracting
officers, and interviews with business planners (Government and contractor).
B. OBSERVATIONS AND ANALYSIS
1. Partnering is politically an "easy pill to swallow," and allows for both a
public and private industrial base.
Chapter II identified the politically-charged and divisive environment regarding the
performance of depot-level maintenance. Although chapter II focused primarily on issues
associated with outsourcing depot-level maintenance, it identified that depot-level
maintenance and Public/Private Competition (PPC) is a "front-burner" issue.
Unfortunately, the debates over outsourcing had traditionally been approached as a zero-
sum game in which winner takes all. The outsourcing approach did not allow for
compromise, nor did it focus on balancing and preserving both the public and private
industrial base. This created an extremely threatening environment. As implied in the
interview with former Congressman Browder, a culture of suspicion and mistrust already
exists between the public and private workforces and there is also a mistrust between our
executive and legislative branches of Government.
Creating a partnering arrangement can smooth these suspicions and mistrusts by
allowing the public and private sectors to work together as a team, instead working
57
against each other in an adversarial manner. Partnering arrangements become the
euphoric answer by offering a win-win solution.
While partnering does require compromise, or work-sharing, this "slice of the pie"
is a much better proposition than having no pie at all. In addition, the very nature of the
partnering arrangement indicates that all parties are deriving some benefit from the
partnering arrangement.
This concept of a partnering arrangement is relatively easily sold at strategic-levels,
but it is sometimes a hard sell at the worker-level. The interview with former
Congressman Browder illustrated this phenomenon. He stated that implementation of the
AIM XXI concept was met by opposition from some of the ANAD workforce. They
were opposed to the perceived encroachment of their jobs. The Congressman said, that to
provide "shared vision," senior leadership did intervene to discuss, with the workers, the
benefits of a partnering arrangement, and explain the implications of the BRAC on an
already shrinking depot system. After this interjection, or education process, the
workforce more clearly understood the reasoning behind the decision to partner.
2. Partnering is a natural step beyond Integrated Product Teams (IPTs).
Acquisition Reform (AR) has emphatically supported the concept of IPTs in which
multi-disciplinary teams are formed to ensure that "the right thing is being built right, the
first time. "[3 1] The team members are not only from diverse functional backgrounds, they
come from both the Government and contractor. IPTs have repeatedly proven their worth
by preventing costly rework. As IPTs become more widely accepted, and as industry and
the Government become more comfortable working together to design and develop
superior products, the next step will be working together to manufacture these products.
AIM XXI was a "grass-roots" concept developed jointly by GDLS and ANAD's
business planners. From previous projects, these departments had established a working
relationship and saw an opportunity to pursue a mutually-beneficial partnering
arrangement Together, they marketed and developed support of the ATM XXI concept.
58
3. Communication must involve all key players necessary to make the
partnering arrangement successful.
Partnering requires that all parties clearly understand and agree to established roles
and responsibilities prior to entering the venture. Plus, this agreement must be expressed
to all key players in the process. Communication is the key to addressing this issue. A
lack of clearly communicated roles and responsibilities leads to unnecessary delays,
confusion, and a lack of confidence in the partnering arrangement.
The AIM XXI project was marketed as a clearly defined concept. Unfortunately,
this was not necessarily the case. After the concept was approved, it became apparent to
the individuals from TACOM, who acted as facilitators, that many of the loose-ends had
not been tied-down. This was creating a great deal of friction between mid-level
management at GDLS and ANAD. Some of the TACOM facilitators stated that it was as
if many of the mid-level managers had not been read-in on the arrangement.
In addition, TACOM felt there was apprehension to communicate openly on the
part of mid-level management from both GDLS and ANAD. They said that both parties
were quick to elevate issues to TACOM to resolve, rather than attempting to resolve the
issue at their level.
4. Partnering can save money, time, and other resources.
Partnering typically involves two or more established organizations who possess
comparative advantages to enhance the overall performance of all partners involved,
resulting in a "pareto efficiency." Since the organization's core competencies compliment
each other, a synergistic situation is created, allowing the partnership to accomplish a
project usually more quickly, and at less cost.
Phase I of AIM XXI exemplified how two organizations in a partnering
arrangement can pool resources, identify congruencies, and quickly initiate an extremely
successful project. Because ANAD and GDLS were able to work together, they were
able to progress from concept to implementation in less than six months. Interviews with
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sources from GDLS, ANAD, TACOM, and LATP revealed unanimous consensus that
neither ANAD nor GDLS, working alone, were capable of performing phase I as quickly
or any less-costly.
5. Partnering arrangements between public and private operations can be
difficult to administer.
As discussed earlier, the public and private sectors function differently. While the
private-sector is accustomed to operating under the direction of a contractual obligation,
this is not the case for the public-sector.
In the AIM XXI project, a source from the Administrating Contract Office (ACO)
stated they felt there was a notable lack of influence over the public-sector. This lack of
influence resulted in delays in both coordination and resolution of manufacturing
problems. They said they were never able to determine who had control or who
administered the effort of ANAD. Since ANAD was not operating under a contract, they
were also unable to tell who, if anyone, exercised control of ANAD. They were unclear if
the PMO exercised control or if ANAD was self-governing. Seemingly frustrated, they
said, "I administer a contract, not a concept." They felt that many times, their hands were
tied, and their only recourse for problem resolution was to elevate the issue to the PMO
because they only had privity of contract with GDLS.
6. Partnering arrangements are difficult to sustain when expectations
change.
Partnering arrangements require a great amount of commitment from all involved
parties Commitment to the project, the partners, and ultimately commitment to the
customer. Unfortunately, those commitments, if not deeply rooted, can easily shift toward
other opportunities. There are many other sources of influence which ruthlessly compete
for the attention and resources in today's competitive market place. This thought of
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Figure 4. 1 Source: Developed by the Researcher
report on Vertical Integration and Supplier Decisions. The report stated, "Large
corporations sometimes lack a consistent corporate view throughout their diverse business
operations. Economic incentives may at times encourage "sister divisions" to have
different goals." [36, p26] Figure 4.1, is a general model developed from conversations
with COL(Ret) Michael Boudreau and research data from this study. It is an illustration,
not necessarily all inclusive, of the many influences impacting the day-to-day operations of
both the public and private industrial base.
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Although the extent of power wielded by these influences varies greatly, they are
all present and their impact upon the partnering arrangement must be considered. These
influences can, and do, alter a party's level of commitment to the partnering arrangement.
For example, this is illustrated in the AIM XXI case by the controversy over the
Damaged Government Material (DGM) clause of the contract, which was discussed in
chapter III During the negotiations for phase I of the AIM XXI project, TACOM
successfully argued that due to the partnering arrangement, the need for a DGM clause for
material coming from ANAD did not exist
The DGM clause became a source of contention shortly after the MlAls were
received at the Lima Army Tank Plant (LATP). For various reasons, GDLS did receive
DGM from ANAD. Although ANAD had crews at LATP to assist in the removal of
DGM and installation of good components, GDLS did not believe this was fair
compensation for the lack of a DGM clause. GDLS stated, during the early days of phase
I, that they would never enter into another "No DGM clause" situation. In addition,
GDLS quickly began suggesting ANAD act as a subcontractor, to GDLS, for phases II
and III of the AIM project.
When GDLS was asked about their reasons for wanting a DGM clause and their
desire to use ANAD as a subcontractor, they stated that they felt it was their only remedy
for controlling quality. However, when discussing the DGM clause and the desire to use
ANAD as a subcontractor, sources from both TACOM and the M1A1 Product Manager
Office (PMO) stated they felt GDLS's only desire was for more profit. They explained
that the DGM clause affords GDLS much more profit than simply allowing the ANAD's
representative at LATP to rectify the DGM situation. They were also suspicious of
GDLS's desire to subcontract with ANAD, stating that GDLS would again be able to
make additional profit for their "overhead-burden" incurred through administering the
subcontract
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7. Both parties must see long-term benefits in order to maintain long-term
partnering arrangements.
As stated in Chapter III, parties enter into a partnering arrangement to derive a
benefit. This benefit may be gains in profit, reduction of excess capacity, cost avoidance,
increase in workload to stabilize workforce, etc. However, if one of the parties believes
the benefits gained are not worth the costs expended, the partnership will suffer and
probably fail.
This phenomena was indicated in the previous section regarding DGM and
GDLS's desire to use ANAD as a subcontractor for phase II and III, of AIM XXI. In
addition to that, when GDLS briefed senior Army leadership on alternatives and their
recommendations for enhancements to the tank fleet, they appeared to shift attention away
from the AIM XXI project's phases II and III. When asked about this, GDLS stated that
AIM XXI was encompassed in another proposal for Abrams fleet management.
However, the primary focus of the brief was a push toward additional MlA2s,
which translates into less funds available for M1A1 sustainment. Sources at TACOM and
PMO, stated they did not support the GDLS's unproven initiatives, and that this maneuver
placed AIM XXI at risk. In addition, although ANAD is intimately involved in both the
M1A2 and M1A1 process, they were not informed by GDLS of the briefing to Senior
Army Leadership. This lack of being forthright concerning intentions also indicates that
GDLS was willing to place their partnering arrangement, and the trust already developed,
at risk to pursue more promising long-term benefits elsewhere.
8. Partnering arrangements must have established metrics to measure
success.
Captain lames Anderson, USN, while presenting a seminar entitled, Measuring
Performance in a Contracting Organization quoted Descartes as saying "An unexamined
life is not worth living." [2] This is can easily be paraphrased to say, "an unexamined
partnering arrangement in not worth establishing." Without establishing baselines or
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measures to determine the success of the partnering arrangement, it is impossible to
determine whether or not the partnering arrangement was worth the time and effort
invested.
The AIM XXI project never established metrics for phase I to measure the benefits
of the partnering arrangements for ANAD and GDLS. ANAD and GDLS stated that the
process occurred too fast and furiously to establish metrics for the partnering
arrangement. The only common metric established was the cost-per-mile of the AIM XXI
tank This metric was captured for comparison of the Operations and Support (O&S)
costs associated with operating an AIM XXI tank versus a M1A1 that had not been
through the AIM process As discussed in Chapter III, this information was used by
AAMSA to conduct cost-benefit analysis. While this information was critical for the
deter lation of the success of the AIM XXI project, it could not be used to measure the
success of the partnering arrangement
If ANAD and GDLS had established metrics to measure the success of the
partnering arrangement, it would be much clearer whether or not the arrangement was
successful. Although phase I of the ATM XXI project was touted as a success because it
produced the product on time, it is misleading to extrapolate that the partnering
arrangement between ANAD and GDLS was also a success.
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V. SUMMARY, RECOMMENDATIONS, AND CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY
In the aftermath of winning the cold war, DoD has suffered horrific budget cuts,
particularly in their modernization or procurement accounts. As a result DoD is
aggressively attempting to identify ways to increase efficiency without harming
effectiveness. DoD has identified excess in their infrastructure as an area which is well
suited for achieving increased efficiency. While most stakeholders agree that there is
excess within the DoD infrastructure, there is no generally accepted approach for reducing
the excess.
In the mid 1990's, several reports were published which identified outsourcing as a
tool to help DoD maximize efficiency and maintain effectiveness. These reports have been
widely accepted by some and harshly criticized for their lack of empirical data by others.
The reports proved to be very divisive and created many hostilities in the political arena.
However, as with any situation, there were many things transpiring at one time.
One of DoD's initiatives to increase efficiency was Acquisition Reform (AR)
which launched several initiatives challenging the public and private sectors to work with
each other to increase efficiency and effectiveness Out of these initiatives has evolved the
concept of partnering Partnering strives to capitalize on the strengths of complementary
organizations who have chosen to work together to complete a project or task. The
ultimate goal of a partnering arrangement is to increase or create capabilities. These
increased or created capabilities allow the organizations participating in a partnering
arrangement to accomplish projects or tasks they would not have been able to realize,
either as quickly or cheaply, without the help of the partnering arrangement.
However, not all organizations are capable of operating in a partnering
arrangement. The parties involved must be willing to put forth the effort to establish and
maintain the partnering arrangement. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) has published
a handbook on establishing a partnering arrangement. This book outlines the necessary
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ingredients for a successful partnering arrangement. Prior to publication, Anniston Army
Depot (ANAD) and General Dynamics Land Systems (GDLS) established their own
partnering arrangement to pursue a new concept for sustainment of the M1A1. The
concept was called Abrams Integrated Management for the Twenty-First Century (ATM
XXI).
The AIM XXI concept is detailed in Chapter IV. ATM XXI was divided into three
separate phases The first phase, the "proof of principle," is the focus of the case analysis
for this research Phase I involved ANAD and GDLS in a partnering arrangement to
completely rebuild the Ml Al to a "better than new" condition. In short, phase I involved
the MlAl's inception into the AIM XXI process at ANAD where they were completely
disassembled. Some components were repaired or replaced by ANAD, others were
repaired or replaced by either GDLS or other vendors. Then the hull, turret, and repaired
or new components were shipped to GDLS for reassemble. After completing the ATM
XXI process, the 17 tanks were shipped to the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort
Irwin, California. There they were worked into the rotation cycle to determine a cost-
benefit analysis of the ATM XXI process.
B. CONCLUSIONS
Too many of the individuals involved in making policy behave as though the
question of who should provide support to military weapon systems is an "all or nothing"
wager. This attitude is extremely divisive and only leads to a stagnation or stalemate.
While this attitude may help defend turf, it does nothing to free-up desperately needed
modernization dollars for our aging fleet. There must be an alternative to this school of
thought
Partnering arrangements do offer a suitable alternative. Partnering arrangements,
if planned and executed correctly, capture the best practices of both the private and public
industrial base. They also provide both the private and public sectors a better appreciation
of the unique skills, knowledge, and attitudes which the other is capable of providing.
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Partnering arrangements are capable creating a greatly synergistic effect for not only the
organizations entering into the arrangement, but they can also create a force multiplier for
the entire industrial base.
While partnering arrangements do offer opportunities, they also represent a risk.
This risk appears when organizations are not fully vested and embracing the ideas of open-
communication, trust, and team-building. If this attitude does not permeate the parties
involved in the partnering arrangement, the partnering arrangement is doomed for failure.
Partnering arrangements can wield significant benefits, however, these benefits can only be
achieved after a initial investment of time and effort to determine first and foremost, if the
organizations can work together and share a common vision for the outcome of the
partnering arrangement. Without a congruency of outcome, there is no way the parties
can develop a workable plan to satisfy their divergent goals.
C. RECOMMENDATIONS
1. Prior to approving any partnering arrangements, or allowing the project to
commence, the Program Manager (PM) should thoroughly audit the plan. This audit does
not have to be resource intensive. The PM could randomly identify engineers or business
planners from both organizations for a discussion of the arrangement. This would work as
a truth telling mechanism to ensure the marketers have not sold a concept that has not
been thoroughly planned or understood by the individuals responsible for execution of the
arrangement.
2. Collect past-performance data on organizations entering into partnering
arrangements. Some organizations may misrepresent their long-term intentions to achieve
the short-term benefits from the partnering arrangement. For example, if a project would
not be approved because it is cost prohibitive, or some other reason, the parties may enter
into the partnering arrangement simply to get the contract awarded, or with the notion
that if it does not work toward their favor, they can simply back-out of the partnering
arrangement for future contracts. This represents a form of "buying-in" which is
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intentionally submitting a low bid to get contract, with the intention of driving up the cost
throughout the course of executing the contract. This type of "sharp practice" cannot be
tolerated Therefore, the parties should not be allowed to reap the benefits of partnering
arrangements if they prove themselves to misrepresent their long-term intentions.
Capturing past performance of organizations who enter partnering arrangements could
assist to eliminate misleading practices.
3. Ensure metrics which measure the success of the partnering arrangement are
clearly defined. It is easy to determine if the project was a success, but it is sometimes
difficult to determine if the partnering arrangement was worth the time and effort.
Establishing goals and measures to determine if, or to what degree, those goals were
achieved, is the only way to truly the only way to form a success oriented team.
Disseminating or publishing the metrics provides a catalyst for the organizations to focus
upon, and to internally measure their performance. Without this, it is too easy to slip back
into the "us vs. them" habit.
D. ANSWER TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS
1. Based on the lessons learned from the AIM XXI partnering arrangement
between GDLS and ANAD, what are the critical ingredients for successfully forming
a public/private partnering arrangement?
After interviewing several of the individuals responsible for making phase I of the
AIM XXI project successful, the researcher has determined that AMC's handbook on
"Partnering for Success" is extremely accurate. All of the interviewees cited
communication and prior planning as the most important aspects of a successful partnering
arrangement Many of the sources involved in conflict resolution, said that open
communication could have saved a lot of time and effort. Although establishing trust
between, seemingly competitive organizations, is not an easy task, it is crucial to the
success of the partnering arrangement. An early investment of time an energy to develop
an environment of teamwork pays tremendous dividends over the life of the partnering
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arrangement This trust which is built during the early stages of team building could be
the only thing to stabilize the partnering arrangement during the tough times of the
business cycle.
2. What is the overall DoD environment in relation to the performance of
depot-level maintenance and repair and how does this influence the AIM XXI
program?
As indicated in Chapter II, DoD's policy for depot-level maintenance is to increase
efficiency, possibly through competition, while maintaining the requisite readiness to
protect national interest. Because of the politically-charged environment surrounding the
performance of depot-level maintenance, DoD and political leaders alike seemed to
welcome the partnering arrangement as a balanced option to the bitter wars being waged
regarding outsourcing. Partnering arrangements are viewed as the best of both worlds.
While there are still those who wish relief from legislation inhibiting competition, most feel
that partnering arrangements do reduce excess capacity, increase competition, and
increase efficiency.
3. How does the Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) impact the
partnering arrangement?
Entering a partnering arrangement does not relieve neither the Government nor the
contractor from the requirements of CICA. Partnering arrangements are formed for the
execution of an individual contract. Unless otherwise justified and approved, the contract
must be subjected to full and open competition prior to award every time . The partnering
arrangement does not delude this requirement.
4. How does the "Arm's-Length" interface between the public/private sector
impact partnering arrangements?
This professional, or "Arms-Length," business relationship must be maintained
even if there is a partnering arrangement. The purpose of the separation between the
Government and the contractor is to avoid the appearance of favoritism. This is always
something for which to strive. However, the partnering arrangement "replaces the
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passive, independent, "hands-off ' philosophy of the past — an approach which experience
has shown to be both ineffective and manpower intensive -- with a proactive,
interdependent, team-based approach for the future." [14, p4] The partnering
arrangement "is not an exception to, inconsistent with, or a waiver of any of the rules
relating to procurement integrity and standards of conduct." [14, p6] The parties to the
partnering arrangement must bear in mind their ethical obligation and act accordingly.
Partnering arrangements "cannot be used as a vehicle for the dissemination or exchange of
any competition sensitive, source selection or proprietary data or for the premature or
unilateral release of acquisition-related information prior to its publication to industry in
general." [14, p6]
5. What are the key considerations for a contracting professional in
structuring a partnering arrangement?
After interviewing several individuals involved with the AIM XXI project, and
asking them, "what advice would you offer to someone considering forming a partnering
arrangement," the following is a list of the answers:
• Develop a legal memorandum of agreement
• Determine the work-share split up front.
• Clearly define the limitations of the partnering arrangement.
• Do not oversell the product in pursuit of getting approval.
• Ensure you have open lines of communication and a good understanding of
each other's needs.
• Be flexible, but firm in what the contract must state and for what the (parties)
are responsible.
• Really stress "teamwork" between everyone involved.
• Have an overarching steering team guide integrated product/process teams.
The steering should establish a written charter and each IPT should establish its
own written charter and tasks.
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When you hear of a potential requirement, make sure you get yourself involved
~ the earlier the better.
Partnering/teaming requires significant dedication of time in order to take full





ACO Administrative Contracting Officer
ADR Alternative Disputes Resolution
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AMC Army Materiel Command
AMSAA Army Materiel Systems Analysis Activity
ANAD Anniston Army Depot
APBI Advance Planning Briefings for Industry
AR Acquisition Reform
BRAC Base Realignment and Closure
BUR Bottoms Up Review
CEP Conflict Escalation Procedure
CICA Competition in Contracting Act
CORM Commission on Roles and Missions
DCA Defense Commissary Agency
DESCOM Depot Support Command
DFAS Defense Finance and Accounting Service
DGM Defective Government Materials
DISA Defense Information Systems Agency
DLA Defense Logistics Agency
DMWR Depot Maintenance Work Requirements
DoD Department of Defense












FYDP Future Years Defense Plan
GAO General Accounting Office
GDLS General Dynamics Land Systems
GDP Gross Domestic Product
GFM Government Furnished Material
GOCO Government Owned - Contractor Operated
GPS Gunner's Primary Sight
IPR In Process Reviews
IPT Integrated Product Team
JCS Joint Chiefs of Staff
LATP Lima Army Tank Plant
LRU Line Replaceable Units
MBT Main Battle Tank
MEO Most Effective Organization
MOU Memorandum of Understanding
NPS Naval Postgraduate School
NTC National Training Center
O&S Operation and Support
OMB Office of Management and Budget
PCO Procuring Contract Officer
PEO Program Executive Officer
PM Program Manager
PMO Product Manager Office
PoP Proof of Principle
PPC Public/Private Competition
PWS Performance Work Statement
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QDR Quadrennial Defense Review
SECDEF Secretary of Defense
SOW Statement of Work
SW Software
SWA South West Asia
TACOM Tank-Automotive Command
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